



THE SECURITY AGENCIES’ PERSPECTIVE  




This chapter provides an overview of the context of sport event security and of the various 
types of security agencies (local, national, international, public, and private organisations), 
and other related stakeholders involved in the planning and hosting of sport events. Following 
this overview, research associated with risk, sport event security and safety is presented. The 
chapter concludes by providing suggestions for further reading and future research directions. 
The organisation and delivery of sport events now requires an increasingly systematic 
approach to governance, including planning and managing for every kind of possible risk. 
This process of risk management incorporates the use of security measures to ensure that 
event venues, spectators, athletes and officials are kept safe. In this chapter, security is 
defined as a range of measures adopted by event stakeholders to maintain order, enforce 
relevant legislation, prevent and detect crime, and ensure a feeling of safety. The definition of 
risk management used is, “risk management is a proactive process that involves assessing all 
possible risks to the events and its stakeholders by strategically anticipating, preventing, 





Security at sports events is affected by a range of factors, from local contextual and historical 
aspects (e.g. spectator related tensions) to larger geopolitical influences (e.g. political or 
religious motivation). The reaction to the rising awareness and categorisation of such risks, 
either real or perceived, has been an increase in strengthening events’ protective 
infrastructure, especially since 9/11 (Boyle and Haggerty 2011).  Evidence of the increases 
have been seen at a range of large and smaller sport events, such as the Olympic Games; 
Union of European Football Associations (UEFA) and The Fédération Internationale de 
Football Association (FIFA) events, especially those involving countries with terrorist 
connections; cricket games involving Pakistan; and domestic events such as United States 
(US) college football games, to name just a few.  
 
This contemporary focus on public safety, security and risk mitigation has contributed to a 
range of improvements in event technology, staff training, and operational procedures and 
practices. Correspondingly, the resources allocated to security at sports events have also 
significantly escalated. Security expenditure was $180 million for the Sydney 2000 Olympic 
Games, while security costs topped an estimated $1.9 billion at the London 2012 Olympic 
Games.   
 
Safety and security issues are of a primary concern for a range of event stakeholders, 
specifically key decision-makers, governments, media and the public. These security 
stakeholders have different control powers, interests, needs and agendas, although each 
anticipates specific benefits for their contribution to the organisation and staging of sport 




Terrorism (e.g. the 2013 Boston Marathon, the 1996 Atlanta Centennial Olympic Park 
bombing, and the Olympic Games terrorist attack in Munich 1972) is generally regarded as 
the most serious security issue, especially from the perspective of the Western media 
(Atkinson and Young 2012). However, such acts of terrorism have been infrequent, when 
compared to other security issues. Essentially, the main security risks differ, depending on the 
size, type and context of the sport event, however, generally the majority of risks are 
associated with illegal crowd behaviour (e.g. public intoxication, spectator aggression), local 
crime (e.g. ticket scalping),  political activism (e.g., ‘anti-event’ protests, strikes) and 
terrorism (e.g. bombs or shootings).  
 
Sports event stakeholders have developed sophisticated bid documentation and operation 
manuals to counteract these risks and dictate how security is to be managed. For example, the 
International Olympic Committee (IOC) has introduced a Candidature Procedure and 
Questionnaire. Essentially, this document functions as an evaluation process by which the 
IOC’s Evaluation Commission assesses each applicant city on a number of decision-making 
criteria, each of which is essentially an implicit indicator of risk. Additionally, often in 
agreeing to host events, local, regional and/or federal governments have been required to 
introduce specific event related legislation, by-laws and other legal mechanisms to protect 
venues and limit risk.  However, many of these legal arrangements have been questioned in 




The implementation of policies and practices in relation to sport event security typically 
involves an exercise of power by one or more of the event stakeholders. While the 
mechanisms developed to cope with perceived event security risks have led to the 
development of greater community resilience (Boyle and Haggerty 2009), it has also been 
suggested that sport events have been used as a ‘laboratory’ for introducing new security 
systems, allowing heightened securitisation processes to expand beyond the boundaries of the 
event for which they were originally conceived (Giulianotti and Klauser 2010). Additionally, 
Eick (2011a) has questioned the use of power, implemented under the guise of risk 
management, by event owners/organisers, which can control and influence the host city’s 
security and surveillance strategies, as well as its urban design.  
 
OVERVIEW OF THE STAKEHOLDER GROUP 
Sport event security especially, but not exclusively, at the sport mega event (SME) level, has 
become increasingly multifaceted, multi-layered, pre-emptive, pervasive, technologically 
dependent, politically responsive, complicated, commoditised and costly. Such demands can 
strain the resources of event organisers. These security transformations have also impacted all 
levels of sports events and have meant that the number, variety and power of sport event 
stakeholders involved in security aspects have increased concomitantly.   
 
Sport event security stakeholders now come from the public, private and voluntary sectors at 
local, national and international levels. These stakeholders can include international and 
national intelligence services, homeland security departments, event-dedicated intelligence 
agencies, immigration agencies, police forces, military personnel and security contractors 
hired by the event. Understandably, this mixture can result in vastly different and even 
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conflicting interests, approaches and agendas with various other event stakeholders, including 
the event organisers.  
 
Generally, the security services and police tend to focus their attention on categories such as 
threats from crime, disorder and domestic or international terrorists, whereas the event 
organising committees tend to be more interested in a wider portfolio of security issues 
affecting the organisation and operation of the event, such as hooliganism. As a result, from 
an operational perspective: 
The process of coordination and management of SMEs engages multiple and 
heterogeneous stakeholders coming from the private and public spheres. As a 
result these mechanisms cannot be conceptualised, exclusively, according to a 
vertical, hierarchical, linear and state-centred vision. On the contrary, they 
should be comprehended following a more horizontal and fluid configuration, 
linking together private and public forces and overlapping the clear distinction 
between public and private spheres... they should not be restricted to a 
territorial conception... security consists of dynamic, extensive operations... 
developed through an inter-institutional, supranational labyrinth of different 
networks within governments, outside governments and within the grey areas 
between, beyond the national territory transcending the borders of the host 
country (Mastrogiannakis and Dorville 2013: 135). 
Essentially, a sport event security stakeholder is any organisation or person who has 
something to gain or lose through a security based-relationship with the event. Thus, sports 
events need to adapt to and influence the changing expectations, motivations and perceptions 




Stakeholders have legitimate interests in an organisation or event; and the interests of all 
stakeholders are of inherent value to the organisation or event. The application of stakeholder 
theory to sport organisations has revealed that there can be complex networks of contiguous 
stakeholders and an even more convoluted framework of those whose associations are more 
distant but nevertheless need to be considered (Hoye and Cuskelly 2007). All sports events, 
no matter how big or small, can be advantaged or constrained by their stakeholders’ varied 
agendas, including those agendas relate specifically to security. 
 
Eisenhauser (2013) suggested four global influences on current security management 
processes at sports events: a general increase in commercialisation and commoditisation; 
globalisation; technologisation; and mediatisation. The current crucial place of security as an 
integral part of the planning and staging sport events both reflects and influences the 
increasing importance, especially in Western institutions and societies, of the implementation 
of formal risk management controls, practices and requirements, as well as the ongoing fear 
of major security problems, such as terrorism.  
 
While risk management practice itself is becoming more rigid and isomorphic (cultural and 
geopolitical differences not withstanding), it still requires choices of: ‘which risks to 
discount, which to monitor, and which risks to mitigate and protect against’ (Jennings and 
Lodge 2009: 8).  While ‘safety and security have always been a key function of stadium and 
arena management, with venue managers needing to keep their venues safe and secure within 
a broad risk management perspective’ (Sweaney 2005: 22), since the 11 September 2001 
(9/11) attacks, the threat of terrorism has brought risk and security management to the 




The response of sport stakeholders has resulted in increased security measures (for both 
safety and insurance requirements), not only in the event venues, but also within the 
surrounding event precinct and even host cities. This has at times been enacted through a 
technologically-driven social control agenda that has been criticised for the potential to 
subjugate individuals’ rights (Taylor and Toohey, 2011). Such an approach becomes 
increasingly problematic when these measures are aimed at particular social groups in an 
effort to sanitise an event’s space and can inhibit spectator enjoyment for the majority. For 
example, previously acceptable and seemingly innocent practices, such as beating drums, 
waving flags, and even the “Mexican Wave” have been forbidden in some venues, under the 
guise of providing a safe spectator environment. 
 
In addition to these changes, Clavel (2013: 209) cautions that preventative and intrusive high 
tech surveillance and securitisation is dominating contemporary sport event security 
discourse and practice. Spaaij (2013) suggests that this panopticised approach is a result of 
the growing emphasis on authorities’ use of predictive, anticipatory and preventative action, 
to control all possible sources of danger before they might occur. Further, he suggests that 
this pre-emptive discourse of risk management means that any level of risk, however slight, is 
deemed unacceptable and is monitored. This has meant there has been increasing cooperation 
around sports events between security agencies and nations, which may have not collaborated 
previously or even been opponents (Clavel 2013).  
 
Thus, sport event security has been affected by events and stakeholders outside of sport, 
resulting in increased surveillance and other deterrent measures. However, sports events have 
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not only been a passive recipient in this connection. Clavel (2013) notes that SMEs have 
affected the upwards re-calibration of everyday security processesand have become 
laboratories for the testing security measures, especially those using the latest technologies. 
Additionally, the introduction of ongoing and improved international security collaborations 
between the events’ security stakeholders, including governments nationally and 
internationally, has improved.  
 
The scale, location, and format of a sports event influences its stakeholders’ approach to risk 
and security. For example, multi-sport events, such as the Olympic Games, are mostly 
concentrated in precincts in a single city or region, thus concentrating risk to a relatively 
condensed geographical area.  However, football, rugby, and cricket world cups are usually 
spread over a larger area and may even be co-hosted by more than one country. They may 
also occur over a significantly longer period of time, leading to more potential trouble spots, 
however this also means a corresponding diffusion of risks (Jennings and Lodge 2009). 
 
Additionally, the types of security threats and thus stakeholder responses differ between 
different forms of sports events, especially SMEs. While the Olympic Games have been 
associated with geopolitical conflicts (such as between North and South Korea in 1988) 
and/or terrorism (Munich 1972), 
international football tournaments tend to be associated with pubic disorder, 
violence and organised hooliganism; with large crowds of national (and 
sometimes local) supporters who gather for specific matches during concentrated 
periods of competition. This contrasts with the Olympics where... spectators... 
tend to comprise diverse/transnational audiences that do not divide their support 
across different teams that symbolise historical lines of national conflict. 
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Olympics, Football World Cups and European Championships therefore each 
encounter the problem of creating a platform for racist, nationalist and anti-
capitalist demonstrations, and associated disorder or rioting- but the ways in 
which they are likely to be realised varies quite significantly (Jennings and Lodge 
2009: 10). 
In terms of the organisational and strategic focus of security stakeholders, generally security 
services and police focus their attention on categories such as threats of crime, disorder, and 
domestic or international activists and terrorists. The presence of the military in sport events 
has increased in line with ‘the war on terror’. For SMEs such as the Olympic Games or FIFA 
World Cup, the national government of the host city or country is required by the 
international body in charge of the event (i.e. IOC or FIFA) to ensure the safety of athletes 
and officials. Event organising committees tend to be interested in a wider portfolio of 
security issues affecting the day to day organisation and operations of the event. Thus, sport 
event organising committees usually do not control security but must somehow coordinate it. 
 
Planning for sport event security “involves a strategic process of reviewing recent past events 
to identify potential threats” (Johnson 2006: 3), followed by the allocation of resources to 
prevent the same type of incidents. There is a great deal of homogeneity of security measures 
and responses. This standardised, mimetic approach is understandable as event security 
decisions 
are taken in a state of high uncertainty (and with high search costs for 
weighting information), therefore encouraging searches for options that are 
perceived to be legitimate and successful (mimetic source of isomorphism). 
Second, given the rise of risk management consultocracy over the past decade 
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or so, we can also expect risk management tools to travel across domains, 
thereby performing what Di Maggio and Powell call, normative sources of 
isomorphism. Accordingly, we would expect the presence of a dominant or 
hegemonic discourse regarding appropriate tools of security risk management 
to lead to homogeneous application of risk management tools. Finally, a 
further source for institutional isomorphism is of a coercive nature, and is not 
difficult to find such sources that apply for the security risk management of 
major sport events, namely the 2004 EU Handbook on avoiding terrorist acts 
at major sporting events, as well as the 1985 European Convention on 
Spectator Violence at Sport Events, especially in football (Jennings and 
Lodge 2009: 4).   
Similarly, there has been ‘standardization in stadium designs and emphasis upon the 
importance of creating similar ‘response environments’ so that first responders in emergency 
situations do  not require extensive familiarization with peculiarities of each location, such as 
in relation to exit routes, evacuation plans and so forth’ (Jennings and Lodge 2009: 13). 
While event organisers and venue managers support the evolution of stadia and event control 
in terms of comfort and safety; criticism has come from traditional sport event attendees, 
themselves important stakeholders, who question the lack of atmosphere associated with 
modern dedifferentiated stadia (Paramio, Babatunde, and Campos 2008). 
 
However, not all academics and/or practitioners agree with this view that security is now 
standardised. For example, Spraaij (2013) argues the opposite and claims that the growing 
number and range of security stakeholders has in fact led to security decentralisation and/or 




In terms of security technology, closed circuit television (CCTV) is becoming increasingly 
ubiquitous for monitoring spectator behaviour both at sport event venues and in surrounding 
public places. The CCTV system may be equipped with recognition software. For example, 
biometric face recognition cameras were implemented at the 2006 World Cup in Germany. 
Also increasingly, the CCTV cameras remain after the event concludes, leading to increased 
and ongoing surveillance of the general public, and potentially intruding on individuals’ civil 
liberties. Thus, temporary event security measures may become permanent as surveillance 
mechanisms are used for general public surveillance. This will be discussed in greater detail 
later in this chapter. 
 
Intelligence and security data is increasingly being shared by event security stakeholders on a 
transnational basis for international events. For example, for the 2006 World Cup, Germany 
built on bilateral agreements it had in place with 36 other nations. These mechanisms had 
already been utilised in previous European football tournaments, as well as for the Athens 
2004 Olympic Games (Jennings and Lodge 2009). Furthermore, existing international forces 
such as North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and Interpol (which signed an agreement 
on 9 May, 2010 to share data and cooperation) may be involved (Clavel 2013: 210). 
Additionally, specific international security agencies have been created for SMEs. For 
example, each Olympic Games ‘since Atlanta 1996, has created an Olympic Intelligence 
Centre (OIC) to assimilate information and risk assessments for intelligence of Olympic 
interest through cooperation and information-sharing protocols involving over one hundred 




On a domestic basis this security cooperation also occurs. For the 2012 London Olympic 
Games,  
existing intelligence agencies (such as the Joint Intelligence Committee, MI5, MI6, 
[Government Communications Headquarters] GCHQ and the Defence Intelligence 
Staff) intersect with a number of Olympic specific coordinating organizations: in 
particular the Cabinet-level Olympic Security Committee and the Metropolitan 
Police’s Olympic Security Directorate (OSD). An Intelligence Unit has been 
established within the OSD to gather and share information between security 
stakeholders for London 2012 (Jennings and Lodge 2009: 11).  
While there is a legitimate and important place for risk management and technology in sport 
event management, organisers also need to understand the range of emotional responses to 
these solutions. As Durodie (2007) argues, too much reliance on technical solutions can 
actually heighten the sense of risk.  He also notes that  
perceptions of risks are as important - if not more so - than the actuality of the risks 
we face, as perceptions often determine behaviour. Thus... irrespective of the basis for 
such fears in scientific fact, their effects are real in social consequence, leaving 
governments with little choice but to take such concerns on board and to regulate 
accordingly (Durodie 2007:76). 
 
THE ROLE OF THE STAKEHOLDER  
As previously discussed, hosting a sports event requires significant risk assessment, security 
investment and the projection of resilient security strategies. This investment is generally 
proportional to the scale of the event, with local community events at one end of the spectrum 
and the events that attract an international audience, either as spectators or via media 
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channels, at the other end. The many faceted community and commercial drivers that 
underpin sport events obviously impact on stakeholders’ desire to maintain control over key 
security and surveillance activities.  
 
Irrespective of event size or scope, nearly all post-9/11 security budgets have escalated in 
response to contemporary perceptions of threats of terrorism. Although there is a low risk of 
an actual terrorism incident occurring during an event, there appears to be heightened public 
demand for all possible contingencies to be covered. While tens of thousands of sports events 
run each year without incident, it only takes one high profile situation, such as the Boston 
Marathon bombings on 15 April 2013, which killed three people and injured 264 others, to 
increase public demand for ‘better’ security and safety. In carrying out an assessment of the 
risk of terrorism in the 2020 Olympic Games Applicant Cities, the 2020 Evaluation 
Commission noted, ‘any city in the world can be subject to a terrorist attack either by local or 
international terrorist groups’ (International Olympic Committee 2012b: 3). 
 
Significant resources are invested in a range of security strategies for sport events. These may 
be activated by the event owner, host cities and/or nations. Security strategies in public 
spaces encompass an extensive range of public order, risk, safety and stakeholder brand 
protection and commercial interests associated with an event. As extracted below, the case of 
the 2010 FIFA World Cup (FWC), hosted by South Africa, is a demonstration of the scale of 
safety and security planning and the range of stakeholders required to host a modern large 
scale event.    
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The FIFA World Cup – South Africa 2010 
South African Police Service had a budget of about R1.3 billion (equivalent to USD 146 
million) to address safety and security at the FWC. This is similar to the 2000 Sydney 
Olympics budget (USD 179.6 million), but only about one-eighth of the security budget of 
the 2004 Athens Olympics and 2006 Turin Olympic Winter Games, and less than five per 
cent of the security expenses at the 2008 Beijing Olympics. Approximately R640 million was 
allocated for the deployment of 41,000–44,000 officers. Some R665 million was spent on 
procuring special security equipment, such as crowd management equipment and associated 
body armour. 
 
The City of Cape Town safety and security plan alone accounted for an additional seven fire 
engines; seven law enforcement vehicles; seven traffic motorcycles; 124 fire fighters; 35 
traffic officers; 21 disaster-management officers and 180 law-enforcement officers. More 
than 440 jobs were created and approximately 2,500 people were trained in crowd 
management and the overall safety and security plan involved 3,600 existing police officers 
throughout the Western Cape Province. Some 1,200 new South African Police Service 
members were trained in basic policing, firearm usage and first level crowd management.  
 
There was a 24-hour Provincial Joint Operation Centres in each province where tournament 
matches were played. In the Western Cape, they were based at what was called the Police 
‘War Room’, in Cape Town’s CBD and coordinated with the Venue Operation Centres 
(VOC) and mobile command centres that were set up at the Green Point stadium and at each 
site along the event footprint across the province, including all public viewing area sites. The 
VOC had representatives from Law Enforcement, Emergency Services, South African Police 
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Services, South African Health Military Services, Traffic Services, Metro Police Services, 
Fire and Rescue, Disaster and Risk Management Services, Event Management, Event 
Security Services and other related agencies. 
The Deputy National Police Commissioner remarked, ‘a World Cup is a dream for every 
police chief – I can ask for anything, and I get it!’ 
 (Extract from Eisenhauer 2013:145). 
 
As can be ascertained from the FIFA World Cup example, event safety and security involves 
a complex array of stakeholders. With respect to the Olympic Games, Girginov and Gold 
(2013) reported that the London Organising Committee of the Olympic and Paralympic 
Games operations required interaction with over 150 different agencies, including all spatial 
domains of government, and national and international sponsors and partners. They also 
noted that ‘LOCOG had virtually no pre-existing knowledge and expertise on which to draw 
in matters concerning security, transport, international relations, national coordination, 
emergency services and city logistics’ (Girginov and Gold 2013: 17). 
 
Table 1 outlines key event stakeholders and some of the more common security related 
interventions that they typically pursue. These stakeholders will also interact and respond to 
the local community, athletes, performers, event attendees and associated sport organisations 
that are involved with the event. The security related expectations of each stakeholder, and 
that of the event organiser toward each stakeholder, will vary depending on their relationship. 
Stakeholder expectations can be communicated through consultation, contracts, on-site 





The key interventions identified in Table 1 are each overviewed below with examples of 
occurrences.   
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
Legislation  
It has become common practice, and indeed mandated by some event owners, for the hosts of 
international events, to introduce new legislation as part of the event agreement. Typically, 
these laws and regulations grant police increased powers of control over public spaces 
(Giulianotti and Klauser 2011), or the right to introduce what might be considered as 
intrusive surveillance mechanisms. There are many instances of security-related law reform 
and government intervention. For example, prior to the Athens Olympics, under international 
pressure, the Greek Parliament passed a new anti-terrorist law (2928/2002). Post 9/11, there 
has been a greater mass surveillance and maximum security presence, sanctioned by host 
city/country legislative changes. It has been suggested that governments are often 
manipulated into enacting event-specific legislation as a cost of doing business in exchange 
for hosting the event (Grady, McKelvey and Bernthal 2010). 
 
Legislation may be specific to a single event. For example, in the lead up to the Sydney 2000 
Olympic Games, the New South Wales Parliament passed three new pieces of legislation: the 
Homebush Bay Operations Act and Regulation 1999, the Security Industry (Olympic and 
Paralympic Games) Act 1999, and the Sydney Harbour Foreshore Authority Regulation 1999 
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("the Olympics Security Legislation"). The premise of this new legislation was to control 
behaviour within public spaces (Toohey and Taylor 2012). Broad powers were granted to 
police and other authorities to ensure public order was maintained by directing people to 
move on when behaviour was deemed to constitute obstruction, harassment or intimidation of 
others. The introduction of this legislation was met with some criticism due to the 
discretionary decision-making power given to the police to control public space and the 
disregard of civil liberties. Further, there has been much written about the temporary 
privatisation of public spaces to allow for more intensive surveillance by contracted security 
companies during events than would normally be allowed by police (See: Eick and Töpfer 
2008; or Eick 2011a and 2011b for more detailed discussion).  
 
In a study of the 2010 FIFA World Cup held in South Africa, Eisenhauer (2013) reported that 
the Planning Committee was required to incorporate certain legislation and regulation into 
their safety and security plans, including the 2010 FWC South Africa Special Measures Acts 
(no. 11 and 12. of 2006) and the 2010 FWC By-law(s). Similarly, in the candidature 
documentation for its 2020 Olympic Games bid, Istanbul confirmed that construction 
legislation had been modified to comply with high earthquake resilience standards, and a 
national budget of USD 40 billion will support the ‘Earthquake Resilience Plan’ which 
includes the retrofitting of sports venues (IOC 2012a: 29).  
 
Legislative change is not only instigated by the hosting of mega-events, governments also 
enact new or amended legislation concerning domestic sports events. Hall (2010) noted the 
numerous legislation and security measures enacted by the British government to combat 
hooliganism, crowd control, and terrorism incidents. These included The Football Disorder 
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Act (1989); Football Spectators Act (1989); Football Offenses Act (1991); Football Act 
(1999); Football Disorder Act (2000); and Football Disorder Bill (2001). He suggested that 
these measures  
prohibited hooliganism, categorized the different offenses that a person would be 
charged with, covered both domestic and international terrorist threats to sport 
stadiums, and assured that individuals who were banned would be prevented from 
attending matches inside and outside of Britain (Hall 2010).  
Interestingly quarantined to football, each football club must attain a stadium ‘Safety 
Certificate’ and designate a Safety Officer to assist facility management with safety strategies 
on match day and the recruitment and training of all stewards. 
 
In their report on Olympic Games knowledge transfer, Girginov and Gold (2013) note that 
the  London Organising Committee of the Olympic and Paralympic Games benefited 
significantly from a number of special conditions that were created specifically for the 
realisation of the Games. This included special legislation and security, and as suggested ‘this 
unprecedented level of bracketing is afforded only to the Olympics, as a project of 
exceptional national and international significance’ (Girginov and Gold 2013: 17). 
 
Event related safety and security legislation may also be internally oriented. For example, in 
Australia, the Victorian Occupational Health and Safety Act 2004 (the OHS Act) stipulates 
that event organisers have a duty of care to provide a safe operational environment for 
employees. Under this legislation, event organisers must ensure so far as reasonably 
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practicable that: people are not exposed to risks arising from the operation; and any place 
where employees and self-employed persons work is safe (WorkSafe Victoria 2006). 
 
Urban planning/development  
The controlled or planned development of an area for large event hosting is another common 
safety and security related practice. The control elements may relate to the safeguarding of a 
range of stakeholder concerns and interests, including protecting local residents from crime 
and violence connected with the event, preventing spectator related disturbances, through to 
averting terrorism attacks. Common to this are associated government sanctioned urban 
development initiatives in and around event precincts (Haferburg 2011). Eick (2011a) has 
noted how urban renewal became a goal of the Olympics in the 2000s and, that FIFA has a 
similar stance on how facilities used in hosting the World Cup should be linked to strategies 
for urban regeneration. 
 
In a study of three cities’ sport event strategies, Misener and Mason (2009) explored the links 
between hosting sporting events and community development initiatives. In Edmonton 
(Canada), the sports events strategy was not seen to be directly tied to community 
development objectives. However, in Manchester (UK) and Melbourne (Australia), the use of 
events for development was linked to communities and community development goals. 
Examples were presented of symbolic attempts to foster community development around the 




Yu, Klauser and Chan (2009) noted that there are often wider social and political implications 
and complications connected with these event security-related developments; and Hall (2006) 
opined that SMEs can be used as a political instrument to conceive or legitimise urban 
development strategies. Notably, alongside the many positive initiatives and renewal projects 
associated with event driven urban planning and development, some projects have been 
shrouded in controversy. For example, the Indian city of Delhi hosted the 2010 
Commonwealth Games as an opportunity to increase foreign investment levels and become a 
powerful world player. Delhi underwent significant urban and infrastructure development, 
including new sport stadiums, a new link road network and notably controversial 
beautification campaigns which involved slum demolitions (Dupont 2011). 
 
In a study of the 2010 Vancouver Winter Olympics, Boyle and Haggerty (2011) observed 
that the city’s Project Civil City initiative, promoted urban development in concert with 
intensified levels of policing and securitisation. However, they suggest that the promises by 
event organisers that development would bring benefits to the residents of the city were 
largely unrealised. Similarly, Kennelly and Watt (2011: 776) noted that measures to reduce 
youth crime in East London were a major policy objective before the London Olympics, 
recognising that ‘even two years before the opening ceremonies are scheduled to begin, 
young people living in transitional housing in East London were encountering the revised 
spatial practices that also accompanied the Vancouver Olympics, carried out through 
intensified policing and security regimes’. There was intensification of police ‘stop and 
search’ powers in relation to young people and related ‘clean up the streets’ operations in 
preparation for the world’s intensive glare. Kennelly and Watt suggest that the measures 
acted to stereotype youth as public order risks and that the building of Olympic infrastructure, 
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when coupled with increased policing measures, had a direct impact on some of the youths’ 
everyday lives. 
 
The UN Habitat (2007) reported that one of the main causes of large-scale forced evictions 
are international mega events, including global conferences and international sports events, 
such as the Olympic Games. Such evictions are often undertaken with bulldozers, supported 
by heavy police presence, and the targets are nearly always the residents of poor informal 
settlements or slums. The UN Habitat reported that approximately: 720,000 people were 
forcibly evicted in Seoul and Inchon (South Korea), prior to the 1988 Olympic Games; 
30,000 forcibly evicted in Atlanta prior to the 1996 Olympic Games; hundreds were forced 
from their homes in preparation for the 2004 Athens Olympic Games; and 1.7 million people 
were reportedly evicted in Beijing (China) in the run-up to the 2008 Olympic Games (2007: 
129).  
 
Technologies for security surveillance   
The provision of a safe and secure environment is of high priority for sport event owners, 
event venues, host cities and countries. There are pressures on these stakeholders to portray 
the event as having the latest and most sophisticated security and surveillance measures 
available. This has triggered significant growth of sport event security budgets and a 
corresponding expansion of security expertise and technologies. Within his analysis of mega 
events, Klauser (2010) has argued that host cities have responded to the demands and 
expectations of event owners and the public by constructing enclosed and tightly controlled 
enclaves that are equipped with advanced surveillance technologies and large numbers of 
security personnel. Further, it has been suggested that mega-events may provide platforms for 
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security companies to introduce and pilot new security technologies that potentially present 
wider benefit in society (Giulianotti and Klauser 2011).  
 
The examples of technology related interventions are vast. Prior to 9/11, many technology 
advances and initiatives were spurred by attempts to quell British soccer hooligan violence, 
whereby CCTV systems were installed in all major football stadiums in the UK by the mid-
1990s. This had significant benefit not only for game attendees but globally as the associated 
security surveillance was transferred to urban centres (Giulianotti and Armstrong 1998) and 
other sport facilities and events. 
 
The Athens 2004 Olympic Games required significant urban development and installation of 
surveillance systems which created a sizeable financial burden for Greece. According to 
Minas Samatas, an expert of the Athens Olympic security operation, the surveillance system 
cost $300 million, and years after the Olympics, it remained unworkable (cited in Molnar 
2011). Ironically, Science Applications International Corp (SAIC), the contractor hired to 
deliver a security system used during these Olympic Games, was, in 2013, awarded more 
than $52 million in damages and fees by an international arbitrator, who ordered Greece to 
pay for what the company alleged to be breach of contract. SAIC was contracted in 2003 to 
deliver a command, control, communications, coordination and integration system to prevent 
a terrorist attack during the Olympics and subsequently to serve as a security system for the 
Greek law enforcement community. According to SAIC, Greece used the system for two 
years after the Olympics, but failed to formerly declare ownership of the system or pay SAIC. 
Interestingly, the lack of any major security breach was more to do with the behind the scenes 
diplomacy between the Greek government and Muslim, Arab, Palestinian and Israeli 
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representatives, than the cost of the electronic surveillance system demanded by the US 
security and compliance lobby (Rojek 2013). However, the legacy was such that the Chinese 
organisers of the Beijing 2008 Olympic Games invited experts from over 70 other countries 
to work with them to design and implement the massive surveillance system termed the 
‘Golden Shield’ (Samatas 2011: 3354). This involved 24/7 monitoring of citizens by CCTV 
cameras, Olympic radio frequency identification chips (RFID) tickets and second generation 
national ID cards; phone call monitoring by digital voice recognition technologies; and the 
‘Great Firewall’ system of online censorship and filtering. In 2010, for the Commonwealth 
Games, 2000 CCTV cameras were installed throughout the host city of Delhi (Giulianotti 
2013). 
 
In discussing the 2006 FIFA World Cup in Germany, Eick (2011b) noted that a wide array of 
(FIFA-imposed) security and surveillance technologies were deployed, including airborne 
warning and control system planes, security robots, video surveillance cameras and RFID 
chips. Over 250,000 personal data files of FIFA employees and another 10 million of those 
persons applying for tickets were recorded. While most CCTV systems at public viewing 
areas were dismantled after the World Cup due to legal constraints and costs, some of the 
CCTV continued to operate post event. As Eisenhauer (2013) observed, the World Cup 
facilitated an expansion and centralisation of CCTV systems in not only the hosting sports 
stadia, but also in railway stations and through urban public transport networks. 
 
For the London Olympics, anti-terrorism and crowd control measures involved the use of 
‘unmanned drones, surface-to-air missile systems, and a thousand armed US diplomatic and 
FBI agents policing an Olympic zone divided from the rest of the city by an 11-mile, £80 
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million 5000-volt electric fence’ (Rojeck 2013: vii). Electronic surveillance included 
scanners, biometric ID cards, number plate and facial recognition CCTV systems, disease 
tracking surveillance and checkpoints.  
 
The transfer of security personnel, knowledge and technological hardware between the host 
cities of sport events occurs through a range of activities, from ad hoc to systemised 
processes. Specific policy handbooks and guidelines (such as the 2004 EU handbook on 
securing against terrorist acts at major sports events), standardised procedures from the 
bidding process to the staging of the event and progress monitoring by the organising bodies 
vary between each event. In addition, a key role is played simply by the global circulation of 
public and private stakeholders in security matters, travelling from place to place and from 
event to event (Eisenhauer 2013). 
 
Security technology is, of course, not just the reserve of global mega-events but is now a 
mainstay of most professional sport leagues. For example, the US National Football League’s 
(NFL) facility and event security has been at the forefront of advances. Over 10 years ago 
(2001), the NFL introduced CCTV facial recognition (the FaceTrac system) for the Super 
Bowl. In collaboration with law enforcement databases, the FaceTrac system locates faces, 
allows for searches, comparisons and rapid identification. In 2012, Yankee Stadium was the 
first sports facility to earn recognition under the Federal SAFETY (Support Anti-Terrorism 
by Fostering Effective Technologies) Act. The Stadium successfully passed security tests 
conducted by the Department of Homeland Security, granting the Stadium immunity against 




Security stakeholder partnerships & privatisation  
Sport event security involves the establishment of strategic partnerships between various 
levels of security providers, event organisers, governments, local police, national forces and 
international organisations such as INTERPOL. In recent years, there has been a significant 
shift towards the privatisation of security and the collaboration of multinational corporations 
for event security. According to Control PMSC (private military and security companies), the 
private security industry started in the 1970s in Europe and the USA and has experienced an 
average growth rate of 10 per cent annually. Many security functions previously regarded as 
the domain of the state have been privatised and outsourced, and it has been argued that these 
shifts in governance and the resulting proliferation of market opportunities are closely 
connected to the growth of the private security industry (Eick 2006). This growth has 
triggered an international civil society campaign seeking to regulate the private security 
sector run by Control PMSC. The employment of private security contractors can present 





A case in point: London 2012 Olympic Games and G4S – the failure of a private security 
contractor  
The London Olympics’ security planning and provision created partnerships between 
numerous levels of security organisations, including private security agencies, police, the 
army, the UK Border Agency and intelligence services. London is now referred to as the 
most securitized Games to date and has been labelled as “lockdown London” (Milne 2012).  
LOCOG had contracted G4S, a private security company to provide security at the London 
Olympics. Prior to the Games, the G4S Chief Executive had anticipated that the £284m 
contract would return a £10m profit to the company. However, two weeks prior to the 
Olympic opening ceremony, G4S admitted it was unable to provide the promised 10,400 
security personnel. To rectify the situation, the government deployed army and police 
personnel to ensure security during the Games was not comprised.  
G4S lost £70m on the contract and £7m in associated sponsorship costs; was given a £45m 
restructuring charge and paid £11m to charities, including the armed forces sports 
organisations. The contract failure and resultant bad publicity has had significant 
ramifications for G4S’s reputation, with the company now in a worse competitive position 
than it was prior to the event.  
Source: MacDonald and Hunter (2013). 
For further comment on political dimension of public services having to make up for private 




In the case of the London Olympics, perceptions of the risk to public order and safety were 
no doubt influenced by the terrorist bombings in London on 7 July 2005. These attacks 
occurred within 24 hours of the announcement of the successful London Olympic bid. 
Coaffee, Fussey and Moore (2011) suggested that the timing of the bombings provided a 
basis for police authorities and risk consultants to increase securitisation. Rojek (2013) argues 
that in the same way they did in Athens (2004) and Beijing (2008), international security and 
surveillance corporations lobbied that risk management provision was inadequate, 
subsequently increasing pressure on the IOC and allied government bodies to escalate 
security and surveillance budgets.  
 
Global security firms and contractors have an increasing influence on security approaches, 
technologies, personnel and policies in selling their services, expertise and equipment and 
providing an ever increasing degree of ‘protection’ from risks. Security companies 
strategically use larger international sport events to showcase their products and services for 
broader market exposure. Boyle noted that this is particularly evident within the developing 
world and described this as the ‘mega-event security development nexus’ (2011: 169), which 
links governments, sporting bodies and the security industry. 
 
Recent Olympic Games have epitomised the complexity of relationships between multiple 





A case in point: Vancouver 2010 Winter Olympic Games 
The Vancouver Winter Olympic Games was Canada’s largest ever security operation, and 
involved multiple stakeholders (Government of Canada 2010). There were 15,000 security 
personnel—4,000 members of the RCMP; 1,700 other police officers; 4,500 Canadian Forces 
members; and 4,800 private security personnel, 119 different police forces; security 
background checks on 205,000 applications for Olympic and Paralympic accreditation; and 
700 police representatives from 39 countries took part in the Vancouver 2010 Integrated 
Security Unit International Police Visitation Program. 
In 2003, the Canadian Government assigned security planning for the Games to the Royal 
Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP). The RCMP created the Integrated Security Unit (V2010 
ISU), specifically to manage the Games’ security and establish a network of security-based 
inter-organisational relationships. The V2010 ISU was responsible for planning and 
conducting security operations, uniting law enforcement and the Canadian Forces. The 
V2010 ISU was comprised of representatives from the RCMP and 117 other law enforcement 
agencies, including the Vancouver Police Department, West Vancouver Police Department, 
and Canadian Forces. Specialist police units were deployed for tactical and special weapons 
teams. 
Integrated National Security Enforcement Teams (INSETs) were created. This comprised 
representatives from the RCMP, federal agencies including the Canada Border Services 
Agency and the Canadian Intelligence Service, and police services. INSETs’ task was 
providing anti-terrorism intelligence to V2010 ISU. 
Other key security stakeholders for the Games were: The Canadian Armed Forces (patrolling 
soldiers), The North American Aerospace Defense Command (aerospace warning and 
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control), The Olympic Shiprider Pilot (joint operation between the RCMP’s Federal Border 
Integrity Program and the US Coast Guard). 
Honeywell Canada was employed to provide perimeter intrusion protection services, 
including CCTV and other technological installations. Additional private security, 
Contemporary Security Canada Inc., was contracted to provide private security guards.  
 
Brand and reputation protection  
As the commercial aspects of sport events have accelerated so too have brand protection 
initiatives for both the event and its sponsors. It has been argued that security is now a selling 
point in terms of world-city place branding (Coaffee and Wood 2006). Security is no longer 
just concerned with the safety of people; it also encompasses safeguarding  event precincts to 
showcase the event and sponsors’ brands for commercial gain. The Government of Canada 
signed a Federal Covenant with the IOC to protect the Olympic and Paralympic brands which 
led to the introduction of Bill C-47: The Olympic and Paralympic Marks Act in the House of 
Commons, and the Act became law on 21 June 21 2007 to protect the Olympic and 
Paralympic logos and emblems from unauthorised use (Government of Canada 2010). 
However, a balance is needed between brand protection and over-securitisation. This was 
illustrated during the Beijing Olympics when some Olympic sponsors complained that 
stringent security measures used in the host city transformed the event into the ‘no fun 
Games’ (Boyle and Haggerty 2011).  
 
Analysts (e.g. Eick) have suggested that event owners, such as FIFA, implement rules and 
regulations that unduly exploit the host environment for their own profit and security. 
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Looking at brand and reputation from a different angle, Babiak and Wolfe (2006) were able 
to demonstrate how the Super Bowl XL employed socially responsible event activities as a 
way to include local community groups and enhance consumer loyalty. 
 
Media  
Event security itself is now a component of the mediated spectacle of sport events with public 
acceptance or criticisms channelled through various forms mass media – more recently 
through social media. Intense media attention can actually influence the development and 
implementation of security measures, and shape public perceptions and expectations (Toohey 
and Taylor 2008). Highlighting security risks, particularly in relation to terrorism threats and 
violence, has been a mainstay of media reporting on mega-events such as the World Cup and 
the Olympics, especially from the perspective of the Western media (Atkinson and Young 
2012). Media reports can assist with the legitimisation of security measures.  
 
There was extensive media scrutiny of the massive security presence around the Olympic 
precinct and throughout the host city during the London 2012 Olympics. In writing for the 
Guardian, Graham (2012) noted that the securitisation of the London Olympics involved the 
deployment of more troops than the war in Afghanistan. The media also criticised the Games’ 
large security budget with respect to the then recent funding cuts to welfare, housing and 
legal aid.  
 
More recently, there was extensive media reporting of the 2013 terrorist bombing at the 
Boston Marathon, which was telecast live internationally. This led some media commentators 
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to note that the Universiade, in Kazan, the capital of Tatarstan, the World Athletic 
Championships in Moscow, complete with a 42-kilometer marathon through the streets of 
Moscow, the 2014 Winter Olympic Games in Sochi, the 2014 Russian Formula One Grand 
Prix auto race in Sochi, the 2017 FIFA Confederations Cup, and the 2018 FIFA World Cup 
would focus attention on Russia as the two alleged bombers are ethnic Chechens. In the past 
Chechen separatists have chosen Russian targets with the maximum media impact for 
terrorist acts. It has been reported that after the Boston bombings, Valentin Balakhnichyov, 
president of the Russian Athletics Federation, told Reuters that he was tripling the level of 
security protection for the August marathon through Moscow and that spectators would have 
to go through metal detectors to approach the course. Balakhnichyov also stated that ‘At the 
same time, we don’t want to make Moscow a ghost town’ (Fyodorov 2013).  
 
Operational risk & safety management   
Risk is the possibility of loss resulting from a threat, security incident, or natural disaster. 
Risk management is a systematic and analytical process to consider the likelihood that a 
threat will endanger an asset, individual, or function. This very broad categorisation ranges 
from command, control and communication, to counter-terrorism intelligence and crisis and 
disaster management training, through to security design and implementation and is managed 
through event security management plans.  
 
In their research of two sport event organising committees, Leopkey and Parent (2009) 
identified fifteen risk management issues in large sporting events: financial, organising, 
visibility, political, infrastructure, interdependence, sport, legacy, media, participation, human 
resources, operations, relationships, environment, and threats. The operations category 
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incorporates security, crowd management, safety, health and well-being; and the issue of 
threats encompasses acts of terrorism.   
 
Hanstad (2012) investigated risk management issues from the perspective of a national 
Olympic team before and during the 2010 Winter Olympic Games in Vancouver. The risk 
strategy categories identified in this study were reduction, avoidance, diffusion and 
relationships. As opposed to risk management literature focusing on the host or organising 
committee’s view, Hanstad found that a participating team identified risks as more positive 
opportunities than negative factors.  
 
Each sport event and its stakeholders aim to work together to mitigate risk through plans, 
training and communication. The Australian Grand Prix Corporation which manages the 
annual Formula 1 Australian Grand Prix lists its safety system elements as: 
• leadership and our people; 
• risk assessment and management; 
• hazards and incidents; 
• emergency preparedness; 
• running the venue – event operations; 
• running the event – event product; 
• contractor management; 
• design, construction and maintenance; 
• working with third parties; 
• information and communication; 
• records and documentation; and 




Case Study: Beijing 2008 Olympic Games – The largest security budget ever at the 
Olympics and the role of multiple international stakeholders 
The Beijing Games involved the most extensive security operations and largest security 
budget of any Olympic Games to date. Multiple national and international stakeholders were 
involved in the planning, implementation and management of security for the Games. At the 
national ministerial level, an Olympic Security Command Centre was established. This was 
co-ordinated by the Ministry of Public Security and relevant national departments, including 
the national armed forces. 
 
On an international level, experts from over 70 security agencies were consulted. To manage 
the international securitisation of the Games, an International Police Liaison Department was 
established within the Security Command Centre (Yu et al 2009). BOCOG worked in 
collaboration with INTERPOL in the planning and preparation of security. The establishment 
of strategic relationships between INTERPOL, BOGOC, the Chinese authorities, and law 
enforcement agencies in other participating countries was a high priority in the lead up to the 
Games. As stated by Mr. Zhou Yongkang, State Councilor and Minister of Public Security, 
‘The co-operation between all the stakeholders will significantly insure the security for the 
2008 Beijing Olympic Games’ (quoted in INTERPOL Media Release 2007). Security during 





The securitisation of the Games relied heavily on relationships with international 
stakeholders. In 2005, the International Permanent Observatory on Security Measures During 
Major Events was established. This saw 24 foreign security experts, from ten countries and 
four international organisations, come together to share experiences. This included personnel 
from the US Federal Bureau of Investigation, the United Nations’ Inter Regional Crime and 
Justice Research Institute and the European Police Office. Regular security conferences were 
also organised, which established relationships for future inter-organisational collaborations 
(http://www.interpol.int/en).  
 
The securitisation of the Games also relied heavily on relationships with private security and 
technology companies. Almost 90 per cent of expenditure on security technologies went to 
foreign companies. GE, IBM, HP, Dell, Panasonic and Siemens and many others were 
involved in providing the technology needed for the vast security operations. Security 
expertise and technologies from a number of foreign transnational companies was employed. 
These companies greatly benefitted in aftermath of the Games, in terms of further security 
contracts for large events. 
 
Case Study: English football security system 
Soccer/football hooliganism was perceived as a social problem in the United Kingdom in the 
1980s. In response the Thatcher government sought to wage ‘war’ on football hooligans 




• legal, through punitive sentencing and new laws, such as the Football Offences Act 1991, 
and the Football Disorder Act 2000; 
• bureaucratic, through more specialised policing frameworks, such as within the National 
Criminal Intelligence Service, which included a ‘National Football Intelligence Unit’ and 
other units investigating serious organised crime; 
• bio-technological, through new security technologies and architectures to discipline and 
control behaviour inside stadiums; the strongest illustrations occurred inside stadiums, 
through all-seated stands (which served to pacify and to facilitate the monitoring of 
spectators), and CCTV systems; 
• community policy, through the complete absence of public funding for community workers 
to engage with young spectators – unlike much of mainland Europe; and 
• discursive-ideological, through the diffuse, negative labelling of hooligans and other 
‘enemies’. 
 
Venues and Facilities  
Facility design and management now take into consideration safety and security measures to 
minimise unacceptable behaviour, such as fan violence.  For example, by restricting space 
around the venue for loitering, removing bleacher seating and standing/grass areas to all-
seated facilities and introducing systems for designated fan seating and buffer zones. A range 
of stakeholders are involved in setting facility standards, for example the British Association 
of Chief of Police Officers (ACPO) ‘developed stadium design standards to set parameters 
for construction and design of the ground to reduce crowd management issues and the 




Command and control centres allowing police to monitor areas inside and outside the 
stadium, technological security measures such as CCTV and FaceTrac - used to identify fans, 
run database searches, and send images to security personnel - are now commonplace. As are 
the conduct of risk assessments to determine specific risks, threats and vulnerabilities of 
respective venues. Assessments of each individual event are typically undertaken (Taylor and 
Taylor, 2011) and these may take into consideration relative intelligence for the event, 
historical intelligence of the event (i.e. fan rivalries, different sports), capacity of the stadium, 
and expected attendance (Hall 2010). This provides information for the various event 
stakeholders to have specific security plans. For example, the UK National Counter 
Terrorism Security Office (NaCTSO) has provided best practice guidelines in the following 
areas: access control, screening/searches, traffic and parking, CCTV, and managing event 
staff (National Counterterrorism Security Office 2006). 
 
Security legacy 
The escalating attention given to event securitisation has seen a number of security legacies 
established. Giulianotti and Klauser, (2010: 54) categorise security legacies associated with 
SMEs into six areas: 
1. Security technologies that are piloted or implemented for the SMEs—for example, new 
CCTV or other surveillance systems in major urban centres;  
2. New security practices which are deployed during the SME and then extended into other 
social fields—for example, the widespread use of contracted security officials to police the 




3. Governmental policies and new legislation which are introduced to enhance SME security 
resilience and remain in force afterward—for example, new laws that restrict public 
association or the movement of specific individuals; 
4. Externally imposed social transformations that have at least in part a security focus and 
which take hold before and after the SME—for example, the clearing of specific 
“undesirable” or “unloved” populations from SME spaces; 
5. Generalised changes in social and transsocietal relationships following SME 
securitisation—for example, different relationships between local communities and police 
officials following particular incidents or security strategies at the SME; and 
6. Urban redevelopment which has connections or consequences for SME securitisation—for 
example, slum clearance and rebuilding programs that are intended in part to repopulate and 
commodify specific inner-city localities.  
 
 
Case Study: Athens Olympic Games – a failed legacy? 
- The security regime for the Athens Olympic Games left a significant financial burden 
of Greece.  
- Security spend for the Games was $1.5 billion.  
- The major failure of the security operations was the C4I surveillance project. The 
surveillance system cost $300million and years after the Olympics it remained 
unworkable. lobbying interventions from the security and surveillance industry. 
Pressure from this quarter led to the investment of a $300 million ‘super panopticon’ 
CCTV and information system for the Athens Olympics (2004) (Samatas 2007). 
Graham (2012) estimates that the cost of providing security for each athlete in the 




Case Study: Sydney Olympic Games & Intelligent Risks – ongoing legacy for a private 
company 
- One of the long-term legacies of the Sydney Olympic security operations was the 
establishment of Australian business, Intelligent Risks. The CEO of Intelligent Risks, 
Neil Fergus, was the Director of Intelligence the Sydney Olympic and Paralympic 
Games. Intelligent Risks was created from the expertise that was brought together to 
manage the Sydney Games Security. 
- Intelligent Risks has since provided security advice to a range of mega sport events. 
Most recently their expertise was deployed during the planning of the London 
Olympics. 
- Security companies such as Intelligent Risks are often one of the key stakeholders in 
the initial design of event venues and the early planning of security operations at 
international events.  
SUMMARY 
The wide array of actors involved in sport event security presents a complex, dynamic, inter-
institutional network of stakeholders with varying interests, expectations and power (Hoye 
and Cuskelly 2007; Mastrogiannakis and Dorville 2013). The increase of formal risk 
management controls, practices and requirements is clearly evidenced, as is the seemingly 
constant public amplification of fear of major security problems, especially terrorism.  
Research on security and sport events (cf Eisenhauser 2013; Jennings and Lodge 2009; 
Taylor and Toohey 2011) has related this intensification to the growing commercialisation, 
commodification, globalisation, technologisation and media attention of selected mega-events 
(e.g. FIFA World Cup; Olympic Games).  This in turn has led to an expectation that event 
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organisers should have plans and mechanisms in place to prevent all security risks, no matter 
how remote or unlikely these are (Clavel 2103; Spaaj 2013).  
Another key theme in the literature is the debate about the standardisation of security and 
safety planning, practices and technologies. The homogenisation of risk management tools, 
policies and stadium design (Jennings and Lodge 2009), has been found to alienate spectators 
and fans because of restrictions placed on attendees (Paramio, Babatunde and Campos 2008; 
Taylor and Toohey 2011), facilitate the introduction of intrusive surveillance and control 
measures (Eisenhauser 2013) and herald the introduction of legislation that grants police and 
authorities power and control over public spaces (Giulianotti and Klauser 2011) that extend 
beyond the boundaries and hosting of the event itself. The ever expanding commercialisation 
of events has created another type of security threat – as related to marketing and branding. 
The ability of an event host location to provide a secure environment has even in itself 
become a branding point (Coaffee and Wood 2006).  
The mounting level of high-intensity surveillance and large scale personnel presence (Eick 
2011b; Klauser 2010) is fuelled by demands of security lobby groups (Rojek 2013) and has 
been linked with the shift from government provided security to the growth of use of 
commercial firms (Eick 2006), especially in developing countries (Boyle 2011). The 
influence and impact of event security and safety clearly has wider social and political 
implications (Yu, Klauser and Chan 2009), and the body of research on this aspect of event 
legacy is proving to yield some telling outcomes. Boyle and Haggerty’s (2011) study of the 
2010 Vancouver Winter Olympics and Kennelly and Watt’s (2011) analysis of the London 
Olympics, both pointed to unrealised positive community benefits of event hosting as related 
to event associated security amplifications. Too many times we hear stories of forced 
evictions and local residents’ relocations in the name of event safety and security. Giulianotti 
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and Klauser’s (2010) classification of security legacies into six dimensions provides a useful 
framework for legacy categorisation.  
  
CONCLUSION 
With the escalation of security related interventions, some of which are incredibly costly, the 
question is whether the level of investment in security is a true reflection of what is needed in 
response to an objective security risk assessment. As we have pointed out in previous 
research (Taylor and Toohey 2011) excessive surveillance and control can negatively impact 
on spectator enjoyment and satisfaction, and can be detrimental if associated with a lack of 
tolerance, democracy, or respect for human rights. Security needs to be aligned with branding 
messages for the event, otherwise the event runs the risk of undergoing reputational damage.  
 
SMEs may have substantial security legacies for their stakeholders. The special legislation, 
surveillance interventions, new policing techniques and associated urban redevelopments 
may all remain (Giulianotti and Klauser 2012). The following areas would benefit from 
future research, especially as much has been written on mega-events but there is far less 
information about smaller sport events (e.g. local championships). 
 
There is scope for examining how different cultures may impact the expectations and 
approaches to managing security and safety issues and their importance for the different 
stakeholder groups. Recently, there has been a rise in the number of sport mega-events being 
hosted in the developing Global South. For example, the 2010 Commonwealth Games in 
Delhi, the 2010 FIFA World Cup in South Africa, the 2014 FIFA World Cup in Brazil and 
the 2016 Olympic Games in Rio de Janeiro. Hosting SMEs in these countries raises security 
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issues in regards to violent crime, the state’s monopoly on violence and urban development 
(Giulianotti and Klauser 2012).  
 
Additional research topics might include: 
• The transference of responsibility for security and safety throughout the hierarchy 
of the stakeholders involved in the event (e.g. event owner to local organising 
committee to the local stakeholders).  
• The effect of social media on event security. 
• How is event security knowledge most effectively transferred between different 
types of events and stakeholders? 
 
SUGGESTED FURTHER READING 
Bennett and K.D. Haggerty (eds.) (2011). Security games: Surveillance and control at mega-
events, Routledge, London, 169-184. 
Cornelissen, S. (2011) ‘Mega event securitisation in a third world setting: Global processes 
and ramifications during the 2010 FIFA World Cup’, Urban Studies, 48: 3221-40. 















Atkinson, M. & Young, K. (2012) Shadowed by the corpse of war: Sport spectacles and the 
spirit of terrorism‘, International Review for the Sociology of Sport, 7(3): 286-306. 
Babiak, K., & Wolfe, R. (2006) ‘More than just a game? Corporate social responsibility and 
Super Bowl XL’, Sport Marketing Quarterly, 15: 214-22. 
Boyle, P. and Haggerty, K. (2009) ‘Spectacular security: mega-events and the security 
complex’, International Political Sociology, 3: 257–274. 
Boyle, P.J. & Haggerty, K.D. (2011) ‘Civil cities and urban governance: Regulating disorder 
for the Vancouver Winter Olympics’, Urban Studies, 48(15): 3185-3201.  
Clavel, A. (2013) ‘Armed forces and sports mega events: an accepted involvement in a 
globalized world’, Sport in Society 16(2) pp 205-222. 
Coaffee, J. Fussey, P. & Moore, C. (2011) ‘Laminated security for London 2012: Enhancing 
security infrastructures to defend mega sporting events’, Urban Studies, 48(15): 3311-27. 
Coaffee, J. & Wood, D.M. (2006) ‘Security is coming home: Rethinking scale 
 and constructing resilience in the global urban response to terrorist risk’, International 
Relations, 20(4): 503-17.  
Dupont ,V. 2011 The dream of Delhi as a global city. International Journal of Urban and 
Regional Research. 35 (3), 533–554. 
Durodie. W. (2007) ‘Miscommunicating risk: some key lessons for risk management’,  A 
context statement presented to Middlesex University as part of the requirements for the award 
of a PhD by Public Works. Online. Available at https://eprints.mdx.ac.uk/6468/1/Durodie-
Miscommunicating_risk.phd.pdf (accessed 1 August 2013). 
44 
 
Eick, V. (2006) ‘ Preventive urban discipline: Rent-a-cops and the neoliberal glocalization in 
Germany’, Social Justice. 33(3): 66-84.  
Eick, V. (2011a) ‘”Secure our profits!” The FIFA in Germany 2006’, in C. Bennett and K. 
Haggerty (eds.), Security games. Surveillance and control at mega-events, New York: 
Routledge. 87-102. 
Eick. V. (2011b) ‘Lack of Legacy? Shadows of Surveillance after the 2006 FIFA World 
Cup in Germany’, Urban Studies, 48: 3329-45. 
Eick, V., & Töpfer, E. 2008, April 25. The human and hardware of policing neoliberal 
sportevents: Rent-a-Cops, volunteers and CCTV at the FIFA Championship in Germany 
2006 and beyond. Paper presented at the conference Security and Surveillance at Mega 
Sport Events, Durham University, Durham, UK. 
Eisenhauser, S.( 2013) Managing event places and viewer spaces: Security, surveillance and 
stakeholder interests at the 2010 FIFA World Cup in South Africa. Unpublished PhD thesis, 
University of Technology, Sydney.  
Fyodorov, G. (2013) ‘Entire Moscow marathon route will have metal detectors’. April 25, 
Reuters. )  Online. Available at: http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2013-04-25/sports/chi-
metal-detectors-will-be-installed-along-entire-moscow-marathon-route-20130425_1_metal-
detectors-boston-marathon-luzhniki (accessed 1 August 2013). 
Girginov, V. & Gold, J. (2013) London 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games Knowledge 
Transfer: A Report Prepared for Podium. No publisher details.  
 
Giulianotti, R. (2013) Six security legacies of major sporting events. International Centre for 




Giulianotti, R. & Armstrong, G. (1998) ‘From another angle: Police, surveillance and  
football supporters’, in C. Norris, G. Armstrong and J. Moran (eds.) Surveillance, CCTV & 
social control, Aldershot: Gower/Ashgate. 113-35. 
Giulianotti, R. & Klauser, F.R. (2010) ‘Security governance and sport mega-events: 
Towards an interdisciplinary research agenda’, Journal of Sport & Social Issues, 34: 49-61.  
 
Giulianotti, R. & Klauser, F.R. (2011), ‘Introduction: Security and surveillance at sport  
mega events’, Urban Studies, 48: 157-68. 
Giulianotti, R., & Klauser, F. (2012). Sport mega-events and ‘terrorism’: A critical analysis. 
International Review for the Sociology of Sport, 47: 307-323. 
Goss, B.D., Jubenville, C.B. & MacBeth, J.L. (2003) Primary Principles of Post-9/11 
Stadium Security in the United States: Transatlantic Implications from British Practices. 
Online. Available HTTP: www.iaam.org/CVMS/Post%20911%20Stadium%20Security.doc.  
(accessed 1 August 2013). 
Government of Canada (2010) ‘Canada’s Games: The Government of Canada and the 2010 
Vancouver Olympic and Paralympic Winter Games’. Her Majesty the Queen in Right of 
Canada. Online. Available HTTP: http://www.fin.gov.bc.ca/reports/Canadareport.pdf 
(accessed 1 August 2013). 
Graham, S. (2012) ‘Olympics 2012 security: Welcome to lockdown London’. The Guardian. 
Online. Available HTTP:  http://www.guardian.co.uk/sport/2012/mar/12/london-olympics-
security-lockdown-london (accessed 12 March 2012). 
46 
 
Grady, J., McKelvey, S. & Bernthal, M.J. (2010) ‘From Beijing 2008 to London 2012: 
Examining event-specific Olympic legislation vis-à-vis the rights and interests of 
stakeholders’, Journal of Sponsorship, 3: 144-56. 
Grix, J. (2013) ‘Sport Politics and the Olympics’, Political Studies Review, 11: 15-25. 
Haferburg, C. (2011) ‘South Africa under FIFA’s reign: The World Cup’s contribution to 
urban development’, Development Southern Africa, 28: 333-48. 
Hall, C.M. (2006) ‘Urban entrepreneurship, corporate interests and sports mega-events:  
The thin policies of competitiveness within the hard outcomes of neoliberalism’, Sociological 
Review, 54(2): 59-70. 
Hall, S. (2010) ‘An Examination of British Sport Security Strategies, Legislation, and Risk 
Management Practices’, Sport Journal, 13(2) (unpaginated). 
Hanstad, D. (2012) Risk management in major sporting events: A participating national 
Olympic team's perspective. Event Management, 16 (3): 189-201.  
Hoye, R. & Cuskelly, G. (2007) Sport Governance, Oxford: Elsevier. 
International Olympic Committee (2012a) Report of the IOC 2020 Evaluation Commission 
Games of the XXXII Olympiad, Lausanne: IOC.  
International Olympic Committee (2012b) 2012 2020 Working Group Report / Games of the 
XXXII Olympiad, Lausanne: IOC. Online.  Available at HTTP: 
http://www.olympic.org/Documents/Host_city_elections/Final-report-2020-Working-
Group-English.pdf (accessed 1 August 2013). 
Jennings, W. & Lodge, M. (2009) ‘Governing mega-events: tools of security risk 
management for the London 2012 Olympic Games and the FIFA 2006World Cup in 
47 
 
Germany’ Paper presented at the 59th Political Studies Association, Manchester, 9 April. 
Online. Available HTTP: http://www.academia.edu/209696/Governing_Mega-
Events_Tools_of_Security_Risk_Management_for_the_London_2012_Olympic_Games_an
d_FIFA_2006_World_Cup_in_Germany (accessed 1 August 2013). 
Johnson, C. W. (2006) ‘A Brief Overview of Technical and Organisational Security at 
Olympic Events’, Working paper Department of Computing Science, University of Glasgow, 
Glasgow, Scotland, UK : 1-24. Online. Available 
HTTP:http://www.dcs.gla.ac.uk/~johnson/papers/CW_Johnson_Olympics.pdf (accessed 26 
May 2010). 
Kennelly, J. & Watt, P. (2011) ‘Sanitizing Public Space in Olympic Host Cities: The Spatial 
Experiences of Marginalized Youth in 2010 Vancouver and 2012 London’, Sociology, 45: 
765-781. 
Klauser, F.R. (2010). Splintering spheres of security: Peter Sloterdijk and the fortress city,’ 
Environment and Planning D: Society and Space. 28: 326-340. 
Leopkey, B. & Parent, M.M. (2009) ‘Risk management issues in large-scale sporting events: 
A stakeholder perspective’, European Sport Management Quarterly, 9: 187-208. 
MacDonald, M. & Hunter, D. (2013) ‘The discourse of Olympic security 2012: London 
2012’. Discourse and Society, 24: 66-88.  
Mastrogiannakis, D. and Dorville, C. (2013) ‘Security and sport mega-events: a complex 
relation’, Sport in Society, 16: 133- 139. 
Milne, S. (2012) ‘This is a Corporate Lockdown, Why Not an Olympics for All?’, The 




games (accessed 1 August 2013). 
Misener, L., and Mason, D. (2009) ‘Fostering Community Development Through Sporting 
Events Strategies: An Examination of Urban Regime Perceptions’, Journal of Sport 
Management, 23: 770-94.  
Molnar, A. (2011) ‘Warning to London 2012 Olympic hosts as Greece struggles with 
economy and security: an interview with political sociologist Minas Samatas’. 15 August. 
Online. Available HTTP: http://www.security-games.com/news/warning-to-london-2012-
olympic-hosts-as-greece-struggles-with-economy-and-security  (accessed 1 August 2013). 
National Counterterrorism Security Office. (2006) ‘Counter Terrorism Protective Security 
Advice for Stadia and Arenas’. Association of Chief Police Officers in Scotland. Online. 
Available HTTP: http://nactso-
dev.co.uk/system/cms/files/121/files/original/Stadia___Arenas_2011.pdf  (accessed 1 August 
2013). 
Paramio, J., Babatunde, B., & Campos, C. (2008) ‘From modern to postmodern: the 
development of football stadia in Europe’, Sport in Society, 11: 517- 534. 
Parent, M. (2008) ‘Evolution and issue patterns for major-sport-event organizing committees 
and their stakeholders’, Journal of Sport Management, 22: 135-164. 
 Rojek, C. (2013) Event Power: How Global Events Manage and Manipulate. London: Sage. 
Samatas, M. (2007). ‘Security and surveillance in the Athens 2004 Olympics: Some lessons 
from a trouble story.’ International Criminal Justice Review 17 (3): 220-238. 
49 
 
Samatas, M. (2011) ‘Surveillances in Athens 2004 and Beijing 2008: A Comparison of the 
Olympic Surveillance Modalities and Legacies in Two Different Olympic Host Regimes’, 
Urban Studies, 48: 3347-66. 
Spaaij, R. (2013) ‘Risk, security and technology: governing football supporters in the twenty-
first century’, Sport in Society 16: 167- 183. 
Sweaney, K. (2005) ‘Ready for Anything’,  Australasian Leisure Management 53: 22–30. 
Taylor, T. L. & Toohey, K. (2011) ‘Ensuring Safety at Australian Sport Event Precincts: 
Creating Securitised, Sanitised and Stifling Spaces?’, Urban Studies, 48: 3259-75.    
Toohey, K. & Taylor, T. L. (2008)  ‘Mega Events, Fear, and Risk: Terrorism at the Olympic 
Games’. Journal of Sport Management, 22: 451-469. 
Toohey, K & Taylor, T. L. (2012) ‘Surveillance and securitization: A forgotten Sydney 
Olympic legacy’. International Review for the Sociology of Sport, 47: 324-337. 
Un-Habitat (2007) Enhancing urban safety and security: Global report on human 
settlements. Nairobi, Kenya United Nations Human Settlements Programme. Online. 
Available HTTP: http://www.unhabitat.org/downloads/docs/GRHS.2007.0.pdf (accessed 1 
August 2013). 
WorkSafe Victoria (2006) Advice for managing major events safely. Melbourne: State 
Government of Victoria. Online. Available HTTP: 
http://www.worksafe.vic.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0010/12502/major_events_organisers
_advice.pdf (accessed 1 August 2013). 
Yu, Y., Klauser, F. & Chan, G. (2009) ‘Governing security at the 2008 Beijing Olympics’, 




Table 1  
Stakeholder Interventions 
Stakeholder 
















































































 Training event 
personnel – paid 
and volunteers 
Operational 
Risk & Safety 
management  / 
Hazard Plans 





 Internal risk 
planning 
committee 
Internal risk 
planning 
committee 
Risk planning 
committee 
  
 
